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THE OFFENCE OF STALKING IN POLISH CRIMINAL LAW 
(ART 190A § 1 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE) 
The article discusses the statutory features of the offence of stalking, which is quite new in Polish 
criminal law systems. Therefore its present shape may lead to some controversies and cause some 
interpretation problems, especially in practice. This is important as there are many such offences detected 
each year. 
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Правопорушення переслідування в польському кримінальному праві (стаття 190a §  1 
Кримінального кодексу) 
У статті розглядаються нормативні ознаки злочину переслідування, яке є абсолютно новим у 
польській системі кримінального права. Тому його нинішня форма може призвести до деяких спірних 
питань і викликати деякі проблеми інтерпретації, особливо на практиці. Важливість цієї проблеми 
пояснюється великою кількістю щорічного вчинення цього злочину. 
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Правонарушение преследование в польском уголовном праве (статья 190a § 1 Уголовного кодекса) 
В статье рассматриваются нормативные признаки преступления преследования, которое 
является абсолютно новым в польской системе уголовного права. Поэтому его нынешняя форма 
может привести к некоторым спорным вопросам и вызвать некоторые проблемы интерпретации, 
особенно на практике. Важность этой проблемы обьясняется большим количеством ежегодных 
совершений этого преступления. 
Ключевые слова: преследование, постоянные преследования, притеснения, защита частной 
жизни. 
 
Problem statement. The phenomenon of 
stalking, which is treated as a manifestation of the 
so called emotional violence, has been already 
criminalised in many countries all over the world. 
This was undoubtedly supported by the cases of 
stalking of known persons (among others J. Foster, 
J. Lennon, M. Seles, R. Schaeffer), as well as by 
the results of conducted empirical research which 
demonstrated clearly that a great number of the 
surveyed persons admitted they had experienced 
the phenomenon of stalking [1]. 
Anti-stalking legislation exists both in European 
countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Malta, Holland, Great Britain, 
Italy) and in non-European ones (e.g. Canada, 
Australia, the United States). Poland has belonged 
to these countries since June 6, 2011. As is 
observed by D. Woźniakowska-Fajst, «in Europe 
the phenomenon of stalking is called different 
names, however, most often it is the word stalking 
(in Anglo-Saxon countries) and words which in a 
given language correspond in meaning to stalking 
(e.g. in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Holland, Slovenia or Sweden). Another group is 
formed by countries in which stalking is described 
as «harassment» in the national language (Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
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Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain)». 
The main problem which appears when fighting 
with stalking is the fact that the activities of the 
offender (very troublesome for the victim) often do 
not constitute offences or even petty offences 
(standing in front of the victim’s house or working 
place, writing letters, sending numerous SMS 
messages or e-mails and so on), and they can cause 
the victim a lot of inconvenience. It seems that two 
basic groups of situations characteristic for the 
phenomenon can be distinguished: the first is 
stalking of people closely related to the offender, 
his family (then stalking becomes part of the 
home/partner violence understood in a broad way); 
and the second group comprises stalking of 
strangers (usually commonly known persons). 
D. Woźniakowska-Fajst is right when she states: 
«The tragedy of stalking victims is most visible in 
the fact that the stalker may intimidate them, force 
them to change their habits, plans, make them live 
in constant fear and cause sometimes enormous 
psychological suffering by activities which are 
legally indifferent». The author of research on the 
phenomenon of stalking in Poland, J. Skarżyńska-
Sernaglia states that for 62 % of victims the 
experience of stalking had negative influence on 
their life and health, causing the feeling of being 
endangered, anxiety, psychosomatic disorders and 
problems in interpersonal relationships 
(psychological and relation consequences), 
including: anxiety (attacks of panic, phobias and so 
on) – 49 % of victims, sleeping disorders, eating 
disorders and similar ones – 22 % of victims, 
changes or problems in interpersonal contacts – 
57 % of victims [2]. All this undoubtedly made it 
necessary to research the problem and consider the 
justification of criminalising stalking also in the 
Polish criminal law system.  
Statistical data coming from the Main Police 
Headquarters referring to the period 2011 – 2015 
show that the number of detected offences of 
stalking (art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code) is 
quite significant (except for 2011 when the 
discussed provision came into force on June 6) and 
it reaches around 2500 a year.  
Analysis of recent research and publications. 
The provision of art. 190a § 1 criminalises the act 
of persistent stalking of another person or of a 
person closely related to the victim and thus 
causing the feeling of danger justified by the 
circumstances or significantly infringing on the 
victim’s privacy. The main protected value in this 
case is the freedom understood broadly (both as 
freedom «from something», from fear, from 
soliciting, from unwanted company of another 
person and freedom «to something», mainly to 
preserve one’s privacy). As S. Hypś states, «The 
protected value is the right - connected with the 
protection of human freedom - to live in a feeling 
of safety, i.e. free from any form of harassment, 
stalking and feeling of danger. Therefore it is the 
psychological freedom that is protected as well as 
the victim’s right to protection of his/her private 
and family life, since the offender can be punished 
for significant infringement on the victim’s privacy. 
However, the essence of the offence most often lies 
in the attack on the psyche of a man by infringing 
on his privacy». According to M. Budyn-Kulik, the 
individual protected value is the «value in the shape 
of certain well-being. In the case of the offence 
from art. 190a of the Criminal Code it is the 
psychological well-being. The individual value 
protected by this provision is also the right to 
privacy». The secondary protected value seems to 
be the health of a person (psychological, physical), 
his/her bodily inviolability, correspondence 
inviolability and so on. 
Analysing the discussed provision it should be 
noticed that it contains many unclear features 
leading to serious interpretation difficulties. The 
first difficulty is connected with the verb feature 
«stalks», not defined in the statute. According to 
the dictionary, «to stalk» means «to constantly 
harass, annoy, alarm somebody (with something), 
pester somebody, not give somebody a moment of 
peace». It is stressed in the criminal law doctrine 
that stalking refers to multiple repeated harassment 
consisting of different acts, bothering the victim, 
the aim of which is to distress, annoy or disturb the 
victim or a person closely related to him/her. 
Additional difficulties stem from the fact that the 
stalking described in art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal 
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Code must be persistent. It may be questioned 
whether such a statutory description is justified. 
«Persistent» means difficult to get rid of, remaining 
for a long time or constantly repeated, constant, 
disturbing. The feature of persistence was known in 
the Criminal Code before (art. 145 point 1, art. 209, 
art. 218 and art. 341 § 2 of the Criminal Code) and 
has been interpreted many times (mainly for the 
needs of the offence of not paying alimony). 
In the judicature persistence is understood as a 
long lasting behaviour, repeated, characterised by 
the bad will and stubbornness. In the verdict from 
January 5, 2001 the Supreme Court stated that 
persistence is the antinomy of a single behavior of 
the offender or even of a behaviour repeated a few 
times. It is therefore clear how the problem of 
persistence is treated in practice (when interpreting 
art. 209 of the Criminal Code,) and it may be 
assumed that a similar approach will be present in 
the case of art. 190a (i.e. for the commission of the 
offence even a few acts of the offender will not 
suffice). Undoubtedly when interpreting the 
provision of art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code the 
interpretation of the statutory features of the 
offence of not paying alimony will be useful, yet it 
cannot be indiscriminately applied to art. 190a of 
the Criminal Code. Therefore it is justly underlined 
that since the very word “stalk” implies the 
continuity of behaviour (many acts), it is 
superfluous to imply additional statutory 
requirements according to which the harassment by 
the offender should be persistent [3, p. 441]. Such 
an approach leads to the narrowing of the 
criminalisation range of the provision to the most 
oppressive activities and as a consequence this may 
lead to the limitation of the victims’ protection as a 
result of this requirement. The assessment of 
stalking from the point of view of its persistence 
must be based on the analysis of concrete 
circumstances of a case since it is impossible to 
make a complete list of activities which may be 
treated as manifestations of persistent stalking. And 
this is a task for the criminal courts. 
In the verdict from February 19, 2014 (II AKa 
18/14), referring to art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal 
Code, the Appellate Court in Wrocław stated that: 
«the persistence of the offender’s bahaviuor may be 
inferred from, on the one hand, his special 
psychical attitude which is shown in the tenacity of 
the stalking, i.e. remaining in a kind of 
stubbornness in spite of the pleas and 
admonishments of the victim or other persons 
trying to persuade the offender to refrain from such 
acts, on the other hand – the longer period of time 
when such acts are undertaken. The offender’s 
activities must cause the victim to experience a 
justified feeling of danger or the feeling of 
significant infringement of his/her privacy». This 
opinion is rational, yet one should remember that 
the pleas (e.g. from the victim) or admonishments 
(e.g. from the police) de lege lata are not elements 
forming the statutory features of the offence from 
art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code, therefore they 
are not required for the existence of the offence.  
An interesting problem appears when the 
offender stalks a few persons (who are closely 
related to one another – e.g. the stalking of the 
offender’s wife and children). In such a case to 
properly assess the feature of persistence it is 
necessary to assess jointly all the activities of the 
offender; it is inadmissible to divide single acts 
referring to individual victims. Also the individual 
acts of the offender which are part of the stalking 
do not need to be identical in the case of all the 
victims (e.g. following and calling the wife, SMS 
messages and e-mails sent to the children).  
According to the decision of the Supreme Court 
from December 12, 2013 (III KK 417/13): «In 
order to treat some behaviour as stalking it must be 
persistent, and therefore it must consist of constant 
and significant infringement on the privacy of 
another person and of making the victim feel 
endangered which is justified by the circumstances. 
The law-maker does not require the behaviour of 
the stalker to possess elements of aggression (…). 
For the existence of the offence it does not matter 
whether the offender intends to fulfill his threats. 
The subjective feeling of the victim is decisive here 
and it must be assessed in an objective way». 
The above presented reflections make it again 
necessary to ask about the sense of the statutory 
requirement of «persistence», especially so because 
conducted research shows that the most often cause 
of refusal to start criminal proceedings referring to 
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the discussed offence is the lack of the feature of 
«persistence» in the offender’s behaviour. One 
should not overlook in such cases the possibility of 
establishing that the offence was attempted. The 
offender in such cases, by his behaviour reveals the 
intention of committing the forbidden act and 
directly heads toward its execution [4, p. 19]. Such 
an approach leads to a more effective protection of 
the victim and is the source of yet another argument 
for resigning from the describing of «stalking» as 
«persistent». 
Another doubt is connected with the object of 
the criminal act (stalking of another person or of a 
person closely related to him/her). Closely related 
person means, according to art. 115 § 11 of the 
Criminal Code: a spouse, relatives in the directly 
ascending and descending lines, siblings, relatives 
by marriage in the same line or degree, the adopted 
and adopting person and their spouses and 
cohabitants. Therefore, e.g. a fiancée not living 
together with the victim is not a closely related 
person to him (in the meaning of art. 115 § 11 of 
the Criminal Code). There are some doubts in the 
criminal law doctrine whether a person who stays 
in a cohabiting relationship with a person (of the 
same sex) in the so called partnership relation 
should be treated as a closely related person. In our 
opinion a positive answer is the right one, but this 
opinion is not commonly accepted, therefore there 
may be some doubts in practice connected with this 
issue. On the other hand, the provision referring to 
the «stalking of another person or of a person 
closely related to him/her», establishes quite a wide 
objective range for its application.   
The purpose of this article. It seems that 
stalking, as a rule, will have the form of action, 
however, stalking by omission to act cannot be 
totally excluded, though it can be very rare (just as 
in the case of the offence of maltreatment). The 
offence is a material one (i.e. it must cause changes 
in the outside world to be considered fully 
executed), the result in the feeling of danger of the 
victim or of the person closely related to him/her 
justified by the circumstances or in the significant 
infringement of the victim’s privacy. The use of the 
word «or» by the law-maker should be stressed 
since it results in the fact that for the existence of 
the analysed offence the appearance of one of the 
above indicated results is sufficient (i.e. causing the 
feeling of danger or significant infringement of 
privacy), though it is certainly possible that the two 
results appear together.  
Statemant of the base materials. The broad 
approach to the result for the purposes of art. 190a 
of the Criminal Code can be considered as justified 
since in practice there may appear both such cases 
in which the victim of stalking starts feeling fear, 
changes hi/her s relations with other people or even 
looks for medical help and cases in which the 
victim does not feel endangered (because he/she 
has a very strong psychic construction or it is a 
person who has a very effective personal 
protection). Even when the feeling of being 
endangered is not present but the victim is forced to 
make substantial (uncomfortable) changes in 
his/her private life, the behaviour of the offender 
should be criminalised.  
It should be emphasised that the fulfillment of 
the statutory features of the offence from art. 190a 
§ 1 of the Criminal Code takes place both when the 
result of the persistent stalking is the victim’s 
feeling of danger and when the stalked person does 
not feel endangered but that feeling characterises a 
person closely related to him/her, as well as when 
the danger is felt both by the stalked person and by 
a person closely related to him/her [5, p. 526].  
There is no doubt that there may be such cases 
in practice when the behaviour of the offender does 
not make the victim feel endangered and does not 
significantly infringe on his/her privacy, yet is 
perceived as quite troublesome (though it is not 
connected with changes in the mode of life or in the 
victim’s habits); in such a situation the offender’s 
behaviour – according to M. Budyn-Kulik – 
«fulfills only the statutory features of art. 107 of the 
Code on Petty Offences». Of course, it is quite 
possible, yet one should not overlook the possibility 
of applying the construction of attempt to commit 
the offence from art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code 
in such situations.  
Serious doubts are bound to appear in practice 
when interpreting the expression «infringes on the 
victim’s privacy» (it is not enough to cause the 
danger of infringement of privacy), the more so 
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because the infringement has to be «significant». It 
should be observed that (so far) the term privacy 
has not been present in the Criminal Code. Privacy 
is a term which – in the broadest meaning – 
describes the ability of an individual or a group of 
persons to keep their data and personal habits and 
behaviours publicly unknown. Privacy is often 
considered as a right belonging to an individual. In 
the law doctrine the right to privacy is defined more 
often than the privacy itself. 
One should mention here the reflection of 
Z. Zaleski, who distinguishes closer privacy (strict 
one) which comprises intimacy, states, features and 
processes known only to a given person and further 
privacy (open) which comprises e.g. the possession 
of certain territory. 
The freedom to form social contacts and 
maintain them is also an element of the privacy. It 
may be assumed that for the purposes of art. 190a 
of the Criminal Code two elements will constitute 
the core of privacy: deciding about the circulation 
of information about oneself and unrestricted 
deciding about one’s behaviour. On the ground of 
the civil law, as it is emphasised by Z. Radwański 
and A. Olejniczak: «The privacy of a person 
comprises especially events connected with family 
life, sexual life, state of health, the past, financial 
situation including the obtained income. One may 
talk about infringement on privacy when an act 
attacks the psychic peace of a person, manifesting 
itself in overhearing, following, filming, recording 
of statements, even if they are next not published». 
These remarks may be also applied to art. 190a of 
the Criminal Code.  
The infringement on privacy itself is not enough 
to fulfill the statutory features of the offence from 
art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code; as it has already 
been mentioned, it has to be «significant». Of 
course, one may question whether this requirement 
is reasonable. The opinion could be defended that 
privacy is such an important value that each 
infringement of it is significant. On the other hand, 
it seems that there may be many cases when the 
infringement on privacy can (and should) be treated 
as insignificant (e.g. checking the waste thrown 
away – to a public waste bin – by a known person 
in order to obtain information about his/her diet). 
What was probably meant by the law-maker, was 
the exclusion from the provisions range of 
behaviours which infringe on privacy but not in a 
significant way (so they are slight). One could have 
doubts if such an operation was necessary since 
such insignificant infringement would have been 
assessed on the basis of art. 1 § 2 of the Criminal 
Code anyway (their degree of social harmfulness 
would be minimal). 
The offence from art. 190a § 1 is a common one. 
It is difficult to make any definite conclusions 
about the suspects since we possess data from the 
Police Main Headquarters referring only to 4 
complete years (2012 – 2015). This data shows that 
men dominate as offenders (in 2012 – 78,0 %, in 
2013 – 78,9 %, in 2014 – 80,6 %, in 2015 – 
84,5 %). It is worth mentioning that the percentage 
of young persons (under 20) among the suspects in 
the analysed period was quite significant (though 
the numbers have been decreasing recently): in 
2012 – 16,4 %; in 2013 – 17,6 %; in 2014  – 
14,7 %, in 2015 – 13,7 %. In most cases these 
offences, which should be pointed out, are 
committed by persons over 30 (in 2012 – 63,6 %, in 
2013 – 61,8 %, in 2014 – 63,9 %, in 2015 – 
64,4 %). Also persons over 50 are a significant part 
of the suspects (in 2012 – 17,1 %, in 2013 – 
16,2 %, in 2014 – 15,9 %, in 2015 – 15,5 %).  
As far as the mens rea of stalking is concerned, 
it is an intentional offence. As it is stressed by the 
doctrine, no special colouring of the offender’s 
intention connected with his aim or motivation is 
required. According do M. Budyn-Kulik: «The 
offender does not have to want to cause the victim’s 
feeling of danger or significant infringement on the 
victim’s privacy. The law-maker does not specify 
as well the motivation of the offender. Therefore it 
is legally irrelevant whether the offence was caused 
by the emotion of love or hatred of the victim, the 
desire to annoy the victim, maliciousness or the 
desire to have revenge on him/her». Because of the 
feature of «persistence» which is connected with 
the mens rea of the offence, this part of features has 
to show the direct intent. There are no obstacles, 
however, as it seems, for the feature referring to the 
result (i.e. causing the feeling of danger or 
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significant infringement on privacy) to be 
characterised by both the direct and eventual intent.   
The offence from art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal 
Code is punished with imprisonment from 1 month 
to 3 years. If the imposed punishment does not 
exceed 1 year, then its execution may be 
conditionally suspended (for a probation period 
from 1 to 3 years, and in the case described by 
art. 70 § 2 of the Criminal Code – from 2 to 5 
years). It is also possible to apply to the perpetrator 
of the offence from art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal 
Code the conditional discontinuance of criminal 
proceedings, as well as the institution described by 
art. 37a of the Criminal Code (changeable sanction) 
and 37b of the Criminal Code (mixed punishment). 
In the case of conviction for the offence from art. 
190a of the Criminal Code the following penal 
measures may be imposed: the interdiction to stay 
in specified environments and places, the 
interdiction to contact certain persons, the 
interdiction to approach certain person or to leave a 
specified place of residence without the court’s 
consent, as well as the order to temporarily leave a 
locum occupied together with the victim (art. 41a of 
the Criminal Code), deprivation of public rights – 
art. 40 of the Criminal Code (when the imposed 
imprisonment is at least three years for an offence 
committed as a result of motivation deserving 
special disapproval), interdiction to occupy a given 
position or to perform a given profession (art. 41 of 
the Criminal Code) or making the verdict publicly 
known (art. 43b of the Criminal Code). Sometimes 
the forfeiture of objects (art. 44 of the Criminal 
Code) or of financial profits from the offence 
(art. 45 of the Criminal Code) may be possible, as 
well as the obligation to compensate for damages 
(art. 46 of the Criminal Code). The offence 
described by art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code is 
prosecuted on the victim’s motion.  
As far as the punishments imposed in practice 
are concerned, the dominant one is imprisonment 
with conditional suspension of its execution (in 
2012 – 66,3 % of all convictions, in 2013 – 61,5 %, 
in 2014 – 65,6 %). The second place is occupied by 
the autonomous fine (in 2012 – 18,9 %, in 2013 – 
18,6 %, in 2014  – 15,7 %). The punishment of 
restricted liberty is imposed relatively rarely (in 
2012 – 9,9%, in 2013 – 12,3 %, in 2014 – 11,0 %). 
Even less often is the punishment of imprisonment 
without conditional suspension of its execution 
applied (in 2012 – 4,9 %, in 2013 – 7,6 %, in 2014 
– 7,7 %).  
Conducted empirical research (covering the 
period from June 6, 2011 till June 6, 2012 and 
including 478 cases) demonstrates that there is a 
high number of cases based on art. 190 § 1 – 3 of 
the Criminal Code (only in the first year when the 
provision was binding 5000 cases were registered 
in all prosecution units in Poland, mainly referring 
to art. 190 § 1 of the Criminal Code). Research 
shows that the most often cause of stalking is the 
inability to accept the parting with a partner by one 
of the relationship parties (marriage or 
cohabitation). Stalking most often lasts from 1 to 6 
months (though cases when stalking lasts many 
years, even over 5 years are also not rare). In the 
analysed cases there was, as a rule, a complex of 
behaviours constituting stalking. It was rare for the 
stalking activity to be uniform, the rule was that he 
offender was employing a wider variety of 
unwanted activities (e.g. calling, sending SMS 
messages and e-mails). The basic type of stalking 
consisted of calling with the use of a stationary or 
mobile phone – this type of activity appeared in 284 
cases (of course, usually alongside other stalking 
activities). Stalking by sending unwanted SMS 
messages appeared in 171 cases. It is therefore 
visible that the phone (mainly the mobile one) has 
become an important means of communication, but 
also the basic means of stalking nowadays. As far 
as other means of stalking are concerned, it was, 
among others: persistent visiting (73), sending e-
mails (42), following (39) threatening (34), 
offending (13), observing (11), taking pictures or 
filming (9), sending letters or presents (9), 
disturbing (knocking on the wall, on the door) – 6, 
destroying property (5), violating bodily integrity 
(3), using the inter-phone (3), sending packets with 
excrements (2), maliciously informing various 
institutions about alleged incorrectness in 
conducting some activity and so on. Other, less 
common means of stalking worth mentioning here 
were: hanging mourning ribbons on the doors, 
placing pieces of paper on the door, installing 
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wiretapping, removing handles from windows, 
malicious car parking, spreading defamatory 
leaflets or spreading gossip. The typical accused 
person is male between 22 and 40, single, usually 
employed, without children. In most cases the 
accused plead guilty. In all cases the accused knows 
the victim and in most cases they used to be in a 
close emotional relationship (62,5 %). The typical 
victim is female (in a significant number of cases – 
young.  
To sum up, it should be stressed that the 
introduction of the offence of stalking into the 
Polish criminal law system was justified. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the number of detected 
offences from art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code is 
2500 a year. It can be questioned whether the 
present shape of the offence is proper. The 
provision contains a number of unclear features 
which cause serious interpretation problems. It 
might be a good idea to look at the solutions 
accepted in other countries and use some of them 
(e.g. the synthetic solution in the Belgian Criminal 
Code), as well as to take into consideration the 
remarks expressed in the opinions on the project to 
change the Criminal Code referring to the analysed 
offence. De lege ferenda a few modification could 
be proposed, among others, to replace the 
expression «persistently stalks» only by «stalks». 
The feature of persistence causes many 
interpretation difficulties and the attempts to use the 
solutions referring to art. 209 (not paying alimony) 
are not correct. There are also problems in practice 
with the expression «infringes on the victim’s 
privacy» (and the statute does not define privacy). 
Another problem is connected with the fact that for 
the offence from art. 190a § 1 of the Criminal Code 
to be committed it is not enough that there has been 
an infringement on privacy, but it has to be 
«significant».  
 
References 
1. Woźniakowska-Fajst D. Legal possibilities of 
fighting the phenomenon of stalking. Analysis of 
legal regulations in the legal systems of other 
countries and an opinion about the introduction of 
provisions criminalising that phenemenon into the 
Polish legal order, Warszawa 2009. – Source: 
https://www.iws.org.pl/ pliki/files/Prawne%20mo% 
C5%BCliwo%C5%9Bci%20zjawisko%20stalkingu
%20IWS%20po%20korekcie%202%20D%20Wo%
C5%BAniakowska.pdf. 
2. Skarżyńska-Sernaglia J. Stalking in Poland – 
occurrence and characteristics of the phenomenon). 
– Source: http://psychologia.net.pl/artykul.php? 
level=415 
3. Mozgawa M. The system of criminal law // 
Offences against individual values. – Vol. 10, 
Warszawa. – 2012. – 581 p.  
4. Furman P. An attempt to analyse the statutory 
construction of the offence of persistent stalking // 
Czasopismo Prawa Karnego i Nauk Penalnych. – 
№ 10. – 2012. – P. 15-25. 
5. Sitko J., Dumkiewicz M. Rights of personality 
in the XXI century. New values, rules, technologies 
– Warszawa. – 2012. – 820 p. 
 
